The insurgency fade out of sight

The violence spread like a virus. NATO launched Operation Medusa in neighboring Kandahar in the summer of 2006 - the functioning of the Earth Alliance in the first place. Was a success, of all kinds. Canadian soldiers began the fight ended and the Americans, leading to the Taliban in the border to Quetta. I toured the battlefield with Col. Stephen Williams, a flamboyant American who played heavy metal music as their artillery to hit the Taliban compounds. "Rock'n'roll, man," he said.

However, the Taliban were also adaptation. The insurgency fade out of sight, rather than to attack Western and Afghan forces with bombs and suicide attacks. The casualties of the Western troops mounted a maximum of 711 playing last year. Some 2,700 civilians have also perished. The main problem was that the Afghan government was unable to maintain low catch. In Kabul, Western officials were quick to find solutions.

Each season brought a new initiative - the fight against drug trafficking, the construction of the justice system, root out corruption. At first Western forces demobilized Afghan militias, then began to assemble them. Diplomats attended fundraising events in Tokyo, Berlin and London, trying to maintain interest dialing. The term "Afghanization" - putting Afghan soldiers or police officers at the head - became an article of faith faltering.

However, no amount of money or soldiers seemed capable of mending the deeply dysfunctional relationship at the heart of the matter. The anger and frustration turned to resentment and a deep distrust of both parties. Diplomatic cables from 2009 released by WikiLeaks showed the U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, which Karzai described as "paranoid and weak individuals are not familiar with the fundamentals of nation building." Another wire story noted that Karzai's deputy, Ahmad Zia Massoud, was called into question after coming to Dubai with $ 52 million in cash - raising questions about financial ownership at the highest levels of government.